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It is through the writings of Basil Bernstein that
many social scientists have become aware of the
scientic potential of sociolinguistics
It was then
that the Nazi movement, alone among the nation-
alist and conservative parties, gained a great mass
following and, having achieved this, won over the
support of the Army, the President of the Republic,
and big business|three `long-established institu-
tions' of great power
Then, the
Nazi movement ,
it
In this paper, we explore a proposal, rst put forward by
Prince [1978], to the eect that -clefts serve an appar-
ently subordinating function in discourse. In addition
to the cause-and-eect subordination noted by Prince,
our own data reveals that clefts are also involved in tem-
poral subordination, where the clefted material appears
dissociated from the main time line. Using Scha and
Polanyi's [1988] notation, we can draw a local discourse
structure that illustrates the general subordination re-
lation involved. However, this does not constitute an
explanation of subordination is eected by -clefts.
In an attempt to construct a general explanation for
both sets of cases, we examine Prince's [1978] sugges-
tion that -clefts serve to mark a piece of information
as . We propose that the
of using a cleft both explains the Known Fact
Eect observed by Prince, and accounts for the var-
ious kinds of discourse subordination associated with
-clefts.
We then turn our attention to a third set of data:
-clefts that have a contrastive eect in the discourses
in which they appear, and what goes wrong with those
discourses when they are de-clefted. In some cases, de-
clefting causes no ill-eects. In other cases, however, no
contrastive relation can be retrieved upon de-clefting
and the discourse becomes incoherent.
In the nal section of the paper, we make some specu-
lative comments on an apparently related phenomenon:
the fact that -clefts cannot take as the clefted con-
stituent, which we feel is amenable to a discourse-
structural explanation.
The data for the study were drawn from the Survey of
English Usage corpus of spoken English, the corpus
of written English, and casually-collected data.
To our knowledge, Prince [1978:902] was the rst to ob-
serve that cleft constructions serve a
function in discourse. She observed that for examples
like (1) the information conveyed is `background mate-
rial subordinate in importance to what follows':
(1)
Yet their
very popularity has often deformed Bernstein's ar-
guments; he has been made to say that lower
class children are linguistically `deprived' In
fact, Bernstein's views are muchmore complex than
that. First
She notes in particular that the subordination rela-
tion involved is often (although not always) one of cause
and eect, where the clefted proposition is often in-
tended to be interpreted as the cause. She gives the
following example:
(48a) Here were the ideas which Hitler was later
to use His originality lay in his being the only
politician of the Right to apply them to the Ger-
man scene after the First World War.
. The lessons learned in Vienna
proved very useful indeed.
Prince [1978:902] explains the eect of the cleft in her
(48a) as follows:
If the third sentence of (48a) read
it would tend to suggest a sep-
arate event, and we would lose the notion that it
was all H's doing|a notion conveyed very strongly
by the -cleft's subordinating eect, and under-
lined (though still not asserted) by the last sen-
tence.
[Prince 1978:902]
The Aspectual Eect of the Cleft
Temporal Regression
The Known Fact Eect
Aspectual Class
known fact ef-
fect
to mark a piece of information as fact
dcu
dcu
activities ac-
complishments acheivements states
it
Mr. Butler
It was Mr. Butler who authorised action which
ended in 32 members of the Committee of 100
being imprisoned.
prior
after
Mr. Butler authorised action which ended in 32
members of the Committee of 100 being impris-
oned.
it
originate
Prince's suggestion, then, is that clefts can serve as
suitable vehicles for delivering information that is back-
grounded to the main ow of the discourse, or that is
contingently related to it, by cause-and-eect.
In addition to the cause-and-eect relations noted by
Prince, our own data reveals a further `backgrounding'
function: the use of clefts for temporal subordination.
In (2), for example, an -cleft is being used to introduce
background information elaborating on the nature of a
protagonist in the discourse ( ). This is done
by describing an eventuality that he was involved in at
some previous time:
(2) 1. Mr. Butler, the Home Secretary, decided to meet
the challenge of the `Ban-the-Bomb' demonstra-
tors head-on.
2. Police leave was cancelled
3. and secret plans were prepared.
4.
5. The Committee's president and his wife were
each jailed for a week.
The eect of the cleft is to cause the `background'
information about the authorisation of action to be in-
terpreted as as occurring to the events introduced
in lines 1{3|the decision, the cancellation of leave, and
the preparation of secret plans.
If we look at a de-clefted version of the same dis-
course, we can see that the temporally subordinating
eect of the cleft is removed, creating a rather dierent
eect. The result, (3), has the `authorisation of action'
described in the de-clefted sentence occurring in simple
temporal progression from the `cancellation of police
leave'|in other words, the events introduced in
lines 1{3:
(3) 1. Mr. Butler, the Home Secretary, decided to meet
the challenge of the `Ban-the-Bomb' demonstra-
tors head-on.
2. Police leave was cancelled
3. and secret plans were prepared.
4.
5. The Committee's president and his wife were
each jailed for a week.
Examples such as (1), (48a) and (2) share a property
that has been characterised as the
. Prince states:
Their function, or at least one of their functions,
is ,
known to some people although not yet known to
the intended hearer. Thus they are frequent in his-
torical narrative, or wherever the speaker wishes
to indicate that s/he does not wish to take per-
sonal responsibility for the truth or originality of
the statement being made.
[Prince 1978:899-900]
The cleft can introduce `new' information to the dis-
course, while at the same time signalling that the infor-
mation is to be treated as if it had been there all along.
A signicant feature, then, is that the informationmust
be regarded as not open to conversational negotiation.
Delin [1991] proposed that a speaker who uses an -cleft
that conveys new information in the complement is in-
dicating that the information they are communicating
did not with the speaker, and that they are
therefore not to be held responsible for its truth value.
This Known Fact account has an intuitive appeal;
yet it does not constitute a mechanisable explanation
of the role of the cleft in discourse. One possible avenue
to such an account would be to exploit Polanyi and
Scha's [1988] Linguistic Discourse Model. By adding
an appropriate rule to the grammar for discourse con-
stituent units ( s), we could represent the cleft as
introducing a to be attached as subordinate to the
current node. With an appropriate rule, we would de-
rive a local discourse parse tree with the cleft-sentence
subordinated to its predecessor.
Hence, we can represent the proposition conveyed by
the cleft sentence as subordinate to the existing dis-
course structure. But mere representation does not
make obvious how the syntactic or semantic features
of the cleft are supposed to drive the assignment of
discourse structure. Nor is it obvious that such a sub-
ordination structure supports the Known Fact Eect.
There are plenty of other subordination structures in
Polanyi and Scha's framework that don't indicate that
a Known Fact reading should be associated with the
subordinate elements.
What we want at this point is an account which can
recruit the syntactic and semantic features of the cleft,
to explain the background and regress data that has
been observed, feed into the discourse parse process,
and explain the Known Fact Eect. The basic proposal
we explore here is that it is the aspectual eect of the
cleft that provides the required explanation.
Following Vendler [1967], much consideration has been
given to the \aspectual types" of utterances of English
sentences (cf. Hinrichs [1986]; Dowty [1986]; Moens
and Steedman [1987]). An utterance denotes an even-
tuality of some type; the aspectual type will determine
the relation to other eventualities mentioned in a dis-
course. Vendler's inventory includes ,
, and . Bach
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States:
Events:
Temporal Overlap
it
overlapping
not
before
after
states
non-states dynamic
static pro-
cesses events pro-
tracted momentaneous
happenings culminations
drs
drs
drs
drt
drt
drt
We do not wish to maintain that a reference-time based
account is the best that can be provided. It is, however, a
convenient representational tool.
[1986] takes the space of eventualities to include
and ; in turn, states consist of
and states, while non-states consist of
and . Events are then either
or ; momentaneous events
are either or .
For current purposes, the relevant distinction is that
between states and non-states; in particular, between
states and events. From Bach [1986:6], paradigmatic
cases of verb phrases exhibiting this distinction include
the following:
sit, be drunk, own , love
build , walk to Boston, notice, reach the top
The aspectual class of an utterance is typically deter-
mined by the aspectual class of the lexical verb, by other
elements within the verb phrase, by temporal adverbials
with which the verb phrase co-occurs, and by the noun
phrase itself. Linguistic context will also inuence as-
pectual class assignment. For example, a verb normally
taken to denote a process, such as (4), can form part
of a verb phrase denoting a protracted event, as in (5);
and in combination with certain noun phrases, the same
verb phrase can form part of a sentence (6) denoting a
habitual state:
(4) ran
(5) ran to the station
(6) trains ran to the station
We can now frame the basic proposal we wish to dis-
cuss: -cleft sentences are stative; the presence of
the copular in the cleft head ensures this. We can
thus view a cleft as a function taking either non-state-
expressions or state-expressions as input, and returning
state-expressions as output. (7a) and (8a) denote an
event and a state respectively; but both (7b) and (8b)
denote states.
(7) a. Victoria found the body.
b. It was Victoria who found the body.
(8) a. Victoria knew the killer's identity.
b. It was Victoria who knew the killer's identity.
Consider now theories which attempt to derive the tem-
poral structure of discourse from the syntactic struc-
tures of a sequence of input sentences. In the frame-
work of discourse representation theory, work by Par-
tee [1984], Kamp and Rohrer [1983] and Hinrichs [1986]
has indicated that it is possible to exploit Reichen-
bach's [1947] notions of speech-time, event-time, and
reference-time to drive a process which will add tempo-
ral constraints to a discourse representation structure
( ).
In particular, in past tense narrative, simple event-
expressions are taken to locate an event at an event-
time corresponding to the existing reference-time, and,
in addition, to update the reference-time to a point `just
after' that reference-time. This new time will constitute
the reference-time for the location of the next input ex-
pression. By contrast, state-expressions rstly locate
the state as the existing reference-time; and
secondly do update that reference time. Hence, the
next input expression (denoting event or state) will be
evaluated with respect to the same reference time again.
In this way, construction can encode the relative
temporal locations of the various eventualities. In gen-
eral, one can say that simple event-expressions `move
a narrative along', while simple state-expressions leave
it where it is. More complex expressions, containing
temporal adverbials and perfective or progressive as-
pect, require some complication in the -construction
rules. Take an example like (9):
(9) John met Mary in town. She had broken her leg,
but looked well in spite of it.
The use of the past perfect can be taken to either in-
troduce a ashback sequence, with a set of `secondary
reference points' (as in Kamp and Rohrer [1983:260]),
or else to turn an event expression into an expression
denoting the consequent state of an earlier occurrence
of the contained event (adapting the somewhat dierent
analysis in Moens and Steedman [1987:4]). Assuming
the account of states in general, we would say here
that the consequent state (of Mary having a broken
leg) overlapped with the existing reference time (asso-
ciated with the event of John meeting Mary); the ear-
lier occurrence of an event (of Mary breaking her leg)
being inferrable from the perfective description of the
leg-breakage.
The notion of temporal overlap is a permissive
relation; in a case like (10), we can follow a pair of
event-expressions with various state-expressions, all of
which would say denote states which overlap the
event already introduced.
(10) Someone stole Victoria's car on Friday; they
wrecked it.
a. She was very attached to it.
b. She was very annoyed.
c. It was unlocked.
In fact, we would want to say that Victoria was at-
tached to the car (and perhaps not after) it was
wrecked; that she was annoyed (and probably not
before) it was wrecked; and that its being unlocked fully
overlapped the stealing and wrecking. Arguably, we
can view the states in (10a{c) as providing respectively
some background, a result and an explanation for the
events in (10).
One approach to representing states is to represent
them via intervals of time, bounded by (artefactual)
begin-events and end-events. Such an approach is
22
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Explaining the Known Fact Eect
Capturing these dierences in a DRT-based theory of
discourse would, of course, require additional theoretical ap-
paratus; cf. Lascarides and Asher [1991].
adopted, for example, in Kowalski and Sergot's [1986]
Event Calculus. In discourse, of course, it is not always
possible to nd explicit reference to such beginnings and
endings. Whilst not advocating such a reductive ap-
proach to states here, we note that in some cases, such
as the resultant state in (10b) or the perfect state in
(9), the event which initiated that state may be explic-
itly mentioned. In other cases, such as the background
in (10a) and the explanation in (10c), the event which
lead to the state may be only implicit.
Now, consider the use of clefts as state-denoting ex-
pressions. We would suggest that, in this respect, they
be treated like the others we have considered. We can
say that clefts will denote states which:
1. Overlap with the existing reference time
2. Do not update that reference time
3. Have been initiated by some event, which may be
either explicit or implicit.
These facts arise directly from the aspectual type of the
cleft; in turn, they directly account both for Prince's
observations, and our own. Recall examples (1), (48a)
and (2). In the rst case, the information about Basil
Bernstein's inuence is presented via a cleft. Hence, it
is presented as a state, overlapping with any previously
established time. There is no update to the reference
time; hence the information that follows it temporally
overlaps with it as well. What event brought about the
inuential status of Bernstein's writings is not speci-
ed. Thus, Bernstein's inuence is indeed, as Prince
suggests, background to what follows; this is a case of
background, like (10a).
In Prince's (48a), the timing of the Nazi movement's
gathering of mass support is presented via a cleft iden-
tifying it as the time of Hitler's application of various
ideas. Hence, the information about the timing is pre-
sented via a state|that of having gathered mass sup-
port. In this case, on the analysis, the state over-
laps with a reference-time `just after' Hitler's applica-
tion of the ideas. Again, the state does not itself update
the reference time for the next sentence, so what follows
overlaps with the state. What event brought about the
state of mass support is clear from the context: it is
in fact Hitler's application of the ideas, mentioned in
the previous sentence. Thus, this would be a case of re-
sult, like (10b); Prince's suggestion of a causal relation
is entirely compatible with this.
Finally, Mr Butler's authorisation of various actions
is presented via a cleft (example (2)). Hence, we have
a state of Mr Butler|of having authorised action|
and this state overlaps the reference-time established by
the previous sentence. The state does not update the
reference-time, and so the subsequent sentence overlaps
with this state. Here, the event which brought about
the state of Mr Butler is clearly his authorisation of ac-
tion. It must have initiated the state, so it lies before
the current reference time; but we cannot totally order
it with respect to the reference-times from the previous
sentences of the discourse. This explains why there is
a feeling of `temporal regression' and the associated re-
moval from the main time-line; further world knowledge
would be required to nd the actual relative location of
Mr Butler's action.
The reason de-clefting seems to disrupt the meaning
of the discourse lies in the fact that it converts a state-
expression back into an event-expression. This then
gives the impression that the speaker-writer is introduc-
ing a new event into the discourse and updating it in
the relevant ways; whereas in the clefted versions, any
events introduced by the state itself are either implicit,
or identiable in the previous context. Safe de-clefting
must therefore involve the preservation of the stative
aspect of the relevant cleft sentence; replacement with
a perfect de-clefted sentence should normally suce.
Note that where the de-clefted sentence is already sta-
tive, de-clefting should not disrupt the coherence of the
narrative so severely.
We have indicated that discourse subordination eect
of clefts can be traced to their aspectual class. This sug-
gests that we can correlate the syntactic construction
with a semantic feature, and that this feature could
therefore be recruited by a discourse parsing mecha-
nism, such as the Linguistic Discourse Model proposed
by Scha and Polanyi [1988].
As we noted earlier, Prince [1978] proposed that what
the various clefts had in common was that they marked
a piece of information as fact, known to some people,
but not necessarily to the hearer. By indicating that
they do not accept responsibility for the truth of the
statement, the speaker at once denies that they are the
`informational origin', and makes it clear that the va-
lidity of the statement is non-negotiable.
We would like to suggest that the aspectual eect of
the cleft can explain the Known Fact Eect, in the fol-
lowing way. In the discourses we have discussed, each
piece of information the speaker wishes to convey can
be transmitted via either an event-expression or a state-
expression. When the speaker uses an event expression,
they are explicitly introducing a new referential element
to the discourse: an event. Let us say that speakers are
`responsible' for events alone. Now, when a speaker
uses a state expression, they do two things: they intro-
duce a state to the discourse, and they also implicitly
refer to two further events; the beginning and ending of
that state. But the speaker is not responsible for those
events, because they have chosen to use a construction
which leaves the events merely inferrable, or locatable
in the previous discourse context.
Lascarides and Oberlander [1991] suggest that if
there is no `explicit' indication of where a state starts|
it
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Clefts and Contrast
stressed-focus
informative-presupposition
As noted above, while we would hesitate to make a com-
plete assimilation between the two classes, contrastive clefts
seem to fall into the class that Prince [1978] terms
-clefts.
The notion that relations of contrast and other kinds
of coherence are supported by inferrable (cf.
Hirschberg [1985], Ward [1985]) would also be a useful one
for this analysis.
it
the angel Boaz
use this form of greeting
it is the angel that uses this form
of greeting
used this form of greeting uses this form of
greeting
doubling the selling space to 700 square feet
the new xtures and ttings
be the great-
est expense be costly
It was the new
xtures and ttings to ll this space that would be
costly
the angel uses this form of greeting
The new xtures
and ttings to ll this space would be costly
via the mention of causes or the use of temporal
adverbials|then the start of the state is assumed to
be irrelevant. Here we may gloss `irrelevant' as: un-
known, unknowable or simply to be taken for granted.
Thus, conversely, if the speaker deems the start of the
state to be irrelevant to the discourse in this sense, then
they can use a simple state-expression. This makes a
cleft a natural choice for a speaker who wishes simply
to assert that an eventuality is current at the reference-
time, without indicating anything further about it. So
clefts can deliver information which might otherwise
have been stated earlier without disrupting the ow of
the discourse (cf. Polanyi's [1986:85{87] `true starts');
and they can also deliver information without generat-
ing responsibility for an initiating event whose location
may be unknown, unknowable or simply to be taken for
granted. The former type might be assimilated to what
Prince [1978] has termed -clefts, and
the latter to her clefts.
The observation that the cleft initiates a subordinate
discourse segment also provides us with a potential ex-
planation for a further set of data, namely those clefts
which play a contrastive role in discourse. Contrast
(cf. Lyons [1977], Werth [1984] for a discussion) can be
described as relationship of opposition or comparison
between two (or more) discourse elements that oper-
ates on the basis of some predicate. For example, in
the following case a contrast holds between the cleft
head element and a preceding element, ,
with respect to the predicate :
(11) To this the reply is given that from the verse deal-
ing with Boaz there is no proof of divine approval,
only that Boaz used this form of greeting. But in
the second verse
and hence there is evidence of divine
approval.
It is important to note that the contrastive relation-
ship has two distinct components: the two (or more)
contrastive elements themselves, and the semantic con-
tent relating those elements, thereby allowing the con-
trast to take place. In (11), for example, the relating se-
mantic content is easy to nd, since it is explicitly stated
twice in a way that allows the commonality between the
contrast-supporting predicates to be retrieved immedi-
ately (
). In other cases, however, the relating seman-
tic content is not so simple: understanding the contrast
between
and in (12), for example,
requires a contrastive relation to be constructed out of
the non-identical content of the predicates
and :
(12) Doubling the selling space to 700 square feet was
not to be the greatest expense.
.
We would suggest that it is in these more dicult
cases, where the contrast-supporting semantic relation
is less obvious, or where the contrastive antecedent is
less accessible in some other way (for example, in terms
of its embeddedness within the structure of the dis-
course) that the cleft comes into its own. Evidence for
this comes from the fact that de-clefting in the simpler
cases such as (13) does not cause loss of coherence:
(13) To this the reply is given that from the verse deal-
ing with Boaz there is no proof of divine approval,
only that Boaz used this form of greeting. But in
the second verse
and hence there is evidence of divine approval.
In other cases, however, de-clefting has more disrup-
tive eects. While contrast is successfully established
by the cleft in (12), the de-cleft version, shown in (14),
is much less acceptable:
(14) ?Doubling the selling space to 700 square feet was
not to be the greatest expense.
.
What is happening in the de-clefted cases in order to
disrupt the retrieval of the relationship along which the
contrast takes place? In our discussion of subordination
above, we observed that de-clefting gives the impression
that the speaker-writer is introducing a new event into
the discourse, while in the clefted versions, any events
introduced by the state itself are either implicit, or iden-
tiable in the previous context. In the same way, in the
contrast cases, the loss of the cleft causes the content
of the de-cleft to be interpreted as a new and distinct
thematic development. In this way, the de-clefted in-
formation fails to identify with information already in
the previous context. Because of this, the identication
of the contrastive antecedent, and the semantic infor-
mation linking it to the current proposition, are not
retrieved. In situations where this relationship is not
made clear by means other than the cleft (and it can
be eected by intonation, or through the availability of
an obvious and immediately-preceding antecedent|we
do not suggest that clefts are unique in their contrast-
ing function) the reader's default will be to introduce
a new eventuality into the discourse, probably (in the
absence of other signals) as a co-ordination in the dis-
course structure. In this way, the information upon
which the contrast depends|that the proposition is to
be seen as an elaboration on existing content|is not
preserved.
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In this paper, we have tried to show that vari-
ous apparently unrelated aspects of -cleft function|
subordination, the Known Fact Eect, and the facts
surrounding contrast|can be explained in terms of the
fact that -clefts perform a `stativizing' function. It
is as well at this point, however, to sound a caution-
ary note. We have not yet examined in full those cases
where de-clefting leaves a state-expression. The predic-
tion is that these cases should not seem as bad as when
de-clefting reveals an event-expression, but we have not
yet tested the prediction.
A related issue which ought to be amenable to a prag-
matic explanation is the unacceptability of as clefted
constituent. -clefts (and -clefts, for that matter)
cannot take as clefted constituent:
(15) *It is it that John has decided he wants.
The alternative forms with and , however,
are acceptable:
(16) It is this/that that John has decided he wants.
The restriction on cannot be accounted for by a
simple restriction on pronouns in cleft head position, as
personal pronouns can appear. An obvious, but incor-
rect, explanation would be that is the unstressed vari-
ant of (cf. for example Declerck [1988:14], follow-
ing Kuroda [1968]), and so cannot appear in the cleft's
`stressed' position. However, we know that -clefts reg-
ularly appear with no stress on the head constituent (cf.
Delin [1989] for an analysis); it also appears that is
in any case stressable. A more plausible explanation
may be that , unique among the pronouns, has no
contrastive reading (cf. Werth [1984:134]). Most inter-
esting, however, is work by Linde [1979] that relates
the alternation of and to the `in focus' status of
the referent in relation to the structure of the discourse.
We would expect that an exploration of the lack of
in clefts along these lines might be fruitful.
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